Reading suggestions on EU DISCONTENT

Recent academic materials on the extent and geography of EU discontent

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Populism, Legitimacy and European integration, Brexit.

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Content

Eurosceptics in regions and countries
Regional economy and EU discontent
UK and Brexit
Politico tags with automatic update

Eurosceptics in regions and countries

**Commission paper:** The geography of EU discontent / Lewis Dijkstra; Hugo Poelman; Andrés Rodríguez-Pose; European Commission. DG for Regional and Urban Policy. Luxembourg : Publ. Office, 2018, 34 pages.

This paper focuses on the geography of EU discontent. For the first time, it maps the vote against EU integration in the last national elections across more than 63 000 electoral districts in each of the member states.

**Commission paper:** Public opinion in the EU regions / Flash Eurobarometer 472, Nov 2018.

Datasets with results of interviews with citizens: Subjects: Trust in the EU and in the national government at regional level. Quality of life and optimism for the future of the regions. Economic situation in the regions. Main issues facing the regions. Political representation.

**E-book on demand:** The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism / Ed. Benjamin Leruth (Canberra Univ, AU); Nicholas Startin (Univ Bath, UK); Simon Usherwood (Univ Surrey, UK). Routledge, 2017, 486 pages.

This handbook paints a fuller, more holistic picture of the extent to which the Eurosceptic debate has influenced the EU and its member states. Crucially, it also focuses on what the consequences of this development are likely to be for the future direction of the European project.

This book provides extensive analysis of existing survey data and presents novel experimental data from 18 member states. Provides an innovative approach to understanding attitudes to European integration and the EU.

**Blogpost** by Catherine E. De Vries: Euroscepticism is here to stay, May 2018.


In this article, we examine media coverage of the 2014 European Parliament election to analyse the role of the media in generating democratic legitimacy. By comparing Germany and the UK, we investigate the extent to which news coverage of the EU suffers from a systematic negativity bias.

**E-book on demand:** Trumping the Mainstream: The Conquest of Democratic Politics by Far-Right Populism / Lise Esther Herman; James Muldoon (both Univ Exeter, UK). Routledge, 2018, 286 pages.

This book provides new theoretical tools and empirical analyses to understand the ongoing mainstreaming of far-right populism. Offering case studies and comparative research, it analyses recent political events in the US, UK, France and Belgium.


The book explores the role of Euroscepticism in the EP elections of 2014 both in particular EU Member States and across broader regions.


The book focuses on widespread levels of Euroscepticism and the contemporary European crisis. It presents empirical studies which problematize the role of traditional media coverage on EU attitudes.


Series: Les cahiers Protagoras 1/2017. Numéro consacré à l'alliance réalisée dans le cadre du Parlement européen par deux partis
eurosceptiques, le mouvement 5 étoiles en Italie et le Parti pour l’indépendance du Royaume Uni. Analyse de cette alliance, d’avantage basée sur des objectifs stratégiques que sur une position politique commune sur l’Europe.

**E-journal article:** Contesting the EU in times of crisis: The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism in France / Gilles Ivaldi (Univ Nice, FR). In: Politics, Vol 38/3, April 2018.

This article examines the performance and party system diffusion of Euroscepticism of the French Front National (FN) during recent European crises. The article argues that Europe’s successive crises since 2008 have been essentially ‘absorbed’ by the FN into its existing Eurosceptic framework which is guided by its radical right-wing ideology.

**E-journal article:** The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: Comparative conclusions / Andrea LP Pirro (SNS, IT); Paul Taggart (Univ Sussex, UK); Stijn van Kessel (Queen Mary Univ London, UK). In: Politics, Vol 38/3, April 2018.

Drawing on case studies included in the Special Issue on France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article presents summary cross-national data on the positions of parties, the relative importance of the crisis, the framing of Euroscepticism, and the impact of Euroscepticism in different country cases.

**Full special Issue:** The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis.

**E-journal article:** Does host ideology shape populist parties’ attitudes towards the EU? The links of populism and Euroscepticism in Southern Europe / Carolina Plaza-Colodro (Univ Salamanca, ES); Margarita Gómez-Reino (UNED); Hugo Marcos-Marne (Univ St. Gallen, CH). In: Revista Internacional de Sociología, vol. 76 (4), e112, Oct 2018.

Overall, our article shows that left and right-wing populist parties share what may initially look as a homogeneous Eurosceptic profile. However...

**Blogpost:** Pro-Europe and anti-EU? Reviewing the far right’s view of Europe / Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, Jan 2019.

The 2019 European elections are set to see an unprecedented number of far right parties enter the European Parliament. These parties are for the most part rabidly anti-EU, and widely seen as presenting a danger for its future. However, far right parties have a complex relationship with ‘Europe’ that the label ‘eurosceptic’ does not fully convey.

**Blogpost:** Muddling through: The impact of European crises on Euroscepticism / Open Europe Think Tank, July 2018.

Open Europe co-hosted an expert panel with the University of Sussex to discuss the impact of recent crises on Euroscepticism across Europe. This is an overview of the event.

**Blogpost:** What Euroscepticism looks like in Central and Eastern Europe / Simona Guerra (Univ Leicester, UK). London School of Economics portal, Jan 2018.

Report from a conference in Bratislava, which looked at the forms
Euroscepticism has taken among Latvians, Slovaks, Germans and Austrians since the economic crisis.


We examine how close over 8000 radical right populist party supporters in the UK, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Belgium were in 2014 to their parties on European integration and, for comparison, immigration. We find that, while they closely aligned on immigration, which remains a stronger predictor of support, they did not on European integration.

**Blogpost**: How has Brexit, and other EU crises, affected party Euroscepticism across Europe? / Aleks Szczerbiak; Paul Taggart (both Univ Sussex, UK). London School of Economics portal, Oct 2017.

Brexit has so far had a very limited impact on national party politics across Europe beyond the UK, particularly compared with the earlier Eurozone and migration crisis.


Based on European Social Survey data, developments in public opinion with regard to three personal (but politically relevant) value indicators and three core political value indicators among 15 EU countries are described since the beginning of this century.

**Book for loan**: Euroscepticism as a transnational and pan-European phenomenon : The emergence of a new sphere of opposition / Ed. John FitzGibbon (Boston College, US); Nick Startin (Bath Univ, UK); Benjamin Leruth (Canberra Univ, AU). Abingdon : Routledge 2017, xii, 184 pages.

The volume sets out to explain how such an innately contradictory phenomenon as transnational Euroscepticism has emerged.

**E-journal article**: United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens / Erika J. van Elsas; Armen Hakhverdian; Wouter van der Brug (all Amsterdam Univ, NL). In: West European Politics, Vol 39/6, 2016.

Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes.

While soft Eurosceptics in the Czech Republic consider Brexit to be an opportunity to reform the EU, hard Eurosceptics see Brexit as a call to destroy the EU. Moreover, the position of soft Eurosceptics is closer to the stance of pro-EU parties than to that of hard Eurosceptics.

**Book for loan:** La fin de l'Union européenne / Coralie Delaume (essayiste); David Cayla (économiste). Paris : Michalon, 2017, 254 p.

"Elle est morte de son inaptitude à régler ses problèmes internes autrement que par de brutaux outkases ou par des simulacres de négociations tenant lieu de sommets, où les pays les plus forts finissent par imposer leurs vues, et où l'unique option qui s'offre aux plus fragiles est celle d'une humiliante reddition, comme on l'a vu en Grèce à l'été 2015."


Au soir de la nette victoire du Front national aux élections européennes de 2014, Marine Le Pen annonçait vouloir détruire l'Europe de l'intérieur. À mi-mandat, quel bilan peut-on dresser de l'influence de ces eurodéputés frontistes au sein d'une institution, le Parlement européen, dont ils contestent la légitimité?


Are the stances similar or different from the rhetoric used by the party leadership about EU? And which are the parties in the EP with which it shares similar policy positions?


The findings confirm the premise that party Euroscepticism and the salience of EU issues lead to the centralisation of coordination mechanisms. By contrast, the study refutes the hypothesis that the European agenda is externalised to the ministry of foreign affairs if the cabinet is a Eurosceptic one.


This book explores the neglected issue of Euroscepticism in the Baltic societies. The book consists of a collection of articles from experts in economics, politics and sociology, as well as Eurosceptic politicians.
E-journal article: Blaming Brussels? The Impact of (News about) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes towards the EU and National Politics / Eelco Harteveld; Joep Schaper; Sarah L. De Lange; Wouter Van Der Brug (all Amsterdam Univ, NL). In: Journal of Common Market Studies, Jan 2018, Vol.56(1), pp.157-177.

This paper investigates how the refugee crisis has affected attitudes towards the EU, as well as attitudes towards national institutions.

Full special Issue: EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis.

Regional economy and EU discontent


In this paper, I ask whether Euroscepticism is a by-product of rural–urban divisions, which influences one’s perception of the economy, one’s trust of transnational politics and one’s cultural identity.


This article shows analogies and differences between the two parties and then analyzes their attitudes towards Euroscepticism. The idea is that both in France and in Italy, Eurosceptic feelings are economically-driven and the two parties have been able to capitalize on this sentiment.

E-journal article: Regional redistribution and Eurosceptic voting / Dominik Schraff (ETH Zurich, CH). In: Journal of European Public Policy, Jan 2019, p.83-105.

Combining European Social Survey data with information on regional funding for 123 EU regions, I demonstrate that the probability of a Eurosceptic vote is highest under insufficient compensation. Insufficient compensation occurs among middle income regions that are cut-off from the bulk of funding due to the regional policies’ targeted approach.


We study the implications of the Great Recession for voting for antiestablishment parties, as well as for general trust and political attitudes, using regional data across Europe. We find a strong relationship between increases in unemployment and voting for nonmainstream parties, especially populist ones.

Sociological analysis on the recent political and media discourse. “Not only does this form of politics threaten democratic institutions and inter-group relations, but it also has the potential to alter the contours of mainstream public discourse, thereby creating the conditions of possibility for future successes of populist, nationalist, and authoritarian politics.”

Open research paper: EU transfers and euroscepticism: can’t buy me love? / Alessandro Borin (Bank of Italy); Elisa Macchi (Univ Zurich, CH); Michele Mancini (Bank of Italy). Working Paper Univ Zurich, June, 2018.

“We estimate that increasing the regional per capita EU transfers by 1000€ over the 2000-2014 period reduces the share of Eurosceptic individuals by about 8 percentage points and voters’ support for anti-EU parties by 10 percentage points.”


This paper identifies regional employment changes as causal factors for forming attitudes towards the European Union and voting for eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections.


Populism may seem like it has come out of nowhere, but it has been on the rise for a while. I argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash.

Article: European integration and populism: addressing Dahrendorf’s quandary / Marco Buti; Karl Pichelmann (both DG ECFIN, European Commission). In: LUISS School of European Political Economy Policy Brief 2017, 30.

With its current competences lacking the ability to address distribution effects, the EU is seen as an agent of globalisation rather than a response to it. At the same time, it is charged with undermining national autonomy, identity, and control. This column sets out five guiding principles for policy articulation at the EU level for a new positive EU narrative.

E-journal article: The victims of neoliberal globalization and the rise of the populist vote: a comparative analysis of three recent electoral decisions / Jürgen Essletzbichler; Franziska Disslbacher; Mathias Moser (all Vienna Univ of Economics and Business, AT). In: Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 2018, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp.73-94.

Analysis based on the presidential elections in the US and Austria as well as the referendum on Brexit in the UK. Part of a theme: Globalization at a critical conjuncture?
**Article:** Demand and supply of populism / L. Guiso (Einaudi Institute, IT); H. Herrera (Warwick Univ, UK) M. Morelli (Bocconi Univ, IT); T. Sonno (Univ Cath Louvain, BE). In: CEPR Discussion Papers, 2017.

Following the financial crisis, “the rare combination of markets and governments’ inability to guarantee security has shaken the confidence in traditional political parties and institutions, facilitating an increase in fear, in turn aggravated by threats such as mass migration”.

**E-journal article:** An ever wider gap in an ever closer union: Rising inequalities and euroscepticism in 12 West European democracies, 1975–2009 / Theresa Kuhn; Erika van Elsas; Armen Hakhverdian; Wouter van der Brug (all Amsterdam Univ, NL). In: Socio-Economic Review 14(1): 27–45.

This article asks whether the trend towards greater inequality in European countries has led to an increase in euroscepticism.

**E-journal article:** Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding: Evidence from Italy and France / Lisa Maria Dellmuth (Stockholm Univ, SE); Dominik Schraff (Univ St. Gallen, CH); Michael F. Stoffel (Univ Konstanz, DE). In: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, 55(2): 275–293.

Drawing on theories of distributive politics and federalism, this article argues that electoral institutions provide politicians in the executive branch of national government with incentives to use at least a part of the SIF to buy votes in NUTS 3-level counties...


For populist parties across the continent, in several ways the EU represents the pinnacle of elite-driven, establishment-based politics.

**E-journal article:** Regional inequality in Europe: evidence, theory and policy implications / Simona Iammarino; Andrés Rodriguez-Pose; Michael Storper (all London School of Economics, UK) In: Journal of Economic Geography, 2018, pp.1-26.

Regional economic divergence has become a threat to economic progress, social cohesion and political stability in Europe. Market processes and policies that are supposed to spread prosperity and opportunity are no longer sufficiently effective.

**E-journal article:** From pathology to mainstream phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism debate in research and theory / Cécile Leconte (Sciences Po Lille, FR). In: International Political Science Review, 2015, 36(3), pp.250-263.

The article puts forward some theoretical and methodological proposals for future research on Euroscepticism, by drawing lessons from
comparable academic debates on the notion of populism, and by recasting debates on Euroscepticism in the light of the current financial and Eurozone crises.


This paper analyzes the interconnections between distressed economies and the electoral success of hard-line eurosceptic parties.

**UK and Brexit**

**E-journal article:** Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP / Geoffrey Evans (Oxford Univ, UK); Jonathan Mellon (Manchester Univ, UK). In: Party Politics, Jan 2019, 25(1), 76–87.

We argue that a key political decision on immigration in 2004 facilitated the emergence of a new dimension of party competition and growth in popular support for UKIP leading eventually to the 2016 EU Referendum.


Brexit has changed the political opportunity structure for Eurosceptics that have developed in the period since the Maastricht treaty, removing the unifying and rallying calls of withdrawal and/or radical change to the EU. The achievement of Brexit thus poses an existential challenge, as individuals either demobilise or divert their political energies into other issues.

**E-journal article:** The mismatch between local voting and the local economic consequences of Brexit / Bart Los (Univ Groningen, NL); Philip McCann (Univ Sheffield, UK); John Springford (Centre for European Reform); Mark Thissen (PBL, NL). In: Regional Studies, 2017, 51(5), pp.786-799.

This paper reveals that in the 2016 UK referendum regarding whether to remain in or leave the European Union, the regions that voted strongly for leave tended also to be those same regions with greatest levels of dependency on European Union markets for their local economic development.

**E-journal article:** The malaise of the squeezed middle: challenging the narrative of the “left behind Brexiter” by Lorenza Antonucci (Teesside Univ, UK); Laszlo Horvath (Univ Exeter, UK); Yordan Kutiyiski (Kieskompas, NL); André Krouwel, (Vrije Univ Amsterdam, NL). In: Competition & Change, 2017, 21(3), pp.221-229.

In this article, we challenge the popularized view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote.

We find that exposure to the EU in terms of immigration and trade provides relatively little explanatory power for the referendum vote. Instead, we find that fundamental characteristics of the voting population were key drivers of the Vote Leave share, in particular their education profiles, their historical dependence on manufacturing employment as well as low income and high unemployment.


This article examines the oddities in the Brexit geography and go on to investigate how populist support across European regions is influenced by the interaction of economic/demographic change with varying cosmopolitan/localist influences.

Full Special Issue: Globalization at a critical conjuncture?


The capital of Brexit was Essex. The Leave vote was won in the larger white, middle class commuter county surrounding London. It was won by persuading very large numbers of people in southern-middle England that membership of the EU was terrible for them and their relatives.


Our findings suggest that a large reservoir of support for leaving the EU, and perhaps anti-immigration populism more widely will remain in Britain, so long as immigration remains a salient issue.

Politico tags with automatic update

- euroskeptics - brexit - far right - far left - populism